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Since I have the honor of sharing this program with
the distinguished Attorney General of England and Wales,
it has been suggested I discuss problems of criminal law
administration of mutual interest by way of similarity
or contrast.
heritage.

I need hardly emphasize our common legal

Two hundred years ago the American colonists

rebelled in large measure to make real in this land the
legal traditions they had learned from England to value.
Despite the political separation, we continue to share with
England, in the words that are this meeting's theme, "Common
Faith and Common Law. It
We alsq share contemporary difficulties - among them the

-----"

-- --

~---

increase in crime.

The increase has been an international

phenomenon, though it has emerged more dramatically in this
country than in Western Europe and Great Britain.

One

commentator has written: "As the golden curve of affluence
gathered momentum, the black curve of crime did the same."
Admittedly the statistics are not comparable, but they are
suggestive.

According to figures cited recently in the

Cambridge Law Journal for the decade of 1955 through 1964, the
crime rate in France rose by 70 percent, in the Netherlands
by 54 percent, in Sweden by 44 percent, and in Germany by 26
percent.

This does not appear to be the situation in Japan,

where the c"rime rate is reported to be declining, and to be
lower than it was twenty-five years ago- - where for 1974, it is
written, there were 112 crimes committed for every 10,000

persons, in contrast to the United States report of serious
crimes for that year of 480 crimes for every 10,000 persons.
The explanation given for this contrast, in an essay in the
current issue of The Public Interest

~~~~~~~~~,

is the survival in

strength in Japan of formal and informal smaller units of
social control.

The figures which I have for England are

inadequate but they are to the effect that in the four
years 1971 through 1974 the number of offenses reported to

------

police per 100,000 persons

increased by l7·percent.

I know I need not convince this group of the seriousness
of the crime p%oblem

. in the United States.

In the 1960 s.

the rate of serious crime as measured by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation Crime Index figures rose by 157 percent.
So far as the present situation is concerned, there are
signs that the increase in the crime rate is slowing down.
Figures for the first three months of 1976 show an increase
in the rate of serious crime of four percent over the same
period in 1975, compared with an increase of 18 percent for
the same period of 1975 over 1974.

But even if the increase

in the rate of crime were b:ttought to a halt, we would still
face an incidence of crime in this nation that is intolerably
high.
The high incidence of crime has become a crushing burden
upon the courts.

The efficiency of the

c~iminal

justice system

in deliveririg'swift and certain punishment to those
crime has suffered.

guilty of

In this country.we have often looked rather

enviously to the English criminal justice system as a model
of efficiency.

But if I am correct, the increase in crime has

slowed the pace of the criminal justice system in England.
In England any delay of more than a month between committal
and trial on criminal charges, I am told, is considered too
long; yet the Lord Chancellor reported in November 1970 that
at Inner London Sessions almost 700 persons had been awaiting
trial for a period between one and six months, 718 for a
period between six and twelve months, and 21 for more than
twelve months.
heavier.

The burden on appellate courts has also become

The reasons given for this include the general increase

in criminal cases, the liberalization in the late'1960s of
the availability of legal aid on appeal, and the curtailment
in 1966 of the power of the Criminal Division of the Court of
Appeal to increase the sentence imposed by the trial court.

In

1965 the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal received 2,852
applications for leave to appeal and heard 440 cases, while
four years later the applications had increased almost:bhreefold
to 8,613, and the cases heard more than doubled to 907.
While the English system is still speedier and more effi
,

cient than ours, it is not surprising that the effects of
increased crime on the two criminal justice systems have been
somewhat similar.

Among these effects, as pointed out in 1972

by Sir Leon Radzinowicz, may be less reporting by the public
of crimes to the police.

When there are failures in detection,

or lengthening delays with concomitant frustrations, "what is the
point (in reporting crimes to the police) when the police can

achieve so little?"
to the police, the

When so many crimes even so are reported
poli~e

"become selective in pursuit."

In

addition the police "try to cut down 'the time to be spent in
court."

Some, especially youngsters. will be let off with a

caution.

Others will have the charges against them reduced

to secure a quick hearing, perhaps in return for a plea of
guilty.
In the United States the result of increasing crime has
been, at least in the past, a decrease in the certainty that
punishment will follow an offense.

This results from inade

quacies in coping with the crime explosion at many stages
of the criminal justice system.

Victimization surveys commis

sioned by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration indi
cate, as one would expect. that a very large percentage of
crime is never reported to police.

According to FBI statistics,

there are only 19 arrests for every 100 serious crimes reported.
Other studies show a very low conviction rate for those
arrested for a felony.
The certainty of imprisonment for an offense appears
greater in England than in the United'States.

James Wilson

writes that in 1971 in England 26 percen~" ,of reported robberies
resulted in some form of custodial punishment.

But his

conclusion is that in Great Britain the certainty of punishment
appears to be on the decline.

tithe probaoility that an

accused robber would be given a custodial sentence in
England fell from 62 chances out of 100 in 1966 to 47
chances out of 100 in 1974 .

The proportion of reported

r~bber-

ies ... that result in custodial sentence is ... even smaller
and has also been declining ... from 30 chances in 1966 to
20 in 100 in 1974. 11

Figures published by the Home Office

in 1974 indicate that 40 percent of reported robberies were
"cleared up" - a phrase that covers a multitude of dispos
itions.
At the level of investigation and prosecutorial attention
in the United States our situation requires unusual efforts
to maximize resources to achieve the maximum deterrent effect.
In the District of Columbia a computerized system has been
developed to help prosecutors determine which cases need the
most urgent attention.

If this approach continues to be suc

cessful in the considerable number of cities in which it is n01;g

_ _ _ _ _ ..... ~
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being tested, it could become an important tool.

--------But even when

the system operates. effectively in thE". indi

so that a crime is solved and the offender
---_.
is arrested and convicted, there is still the matter of
vidual case

imposition of a sentence.
Plea bargaining has been criticized in our country but
recognized as

~ecessary

justice system.

to the survival of the criminal

Reforms have been suggested.

For example.

the American Law Institute's Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
would require a degree of formality and openness in the
process of plea bargaining which is currently often informal
and secret!

It would allow the prosecutor and defense counsel

to discuss proposed agreements with the court and would
require that all plea agreements be reported in open court
and reviewed by the judge.

The ALI Code would also require

that the defendant be represented by counsel in plea
negotiations and would put limits on what indictments a
prosecutor might threaten in order to obtain a guilty plea.

---

---"----------

.

-
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In England, informal plea bargaining has been
roundly condemned.

Nevertheless some aspects of what Lord

Parker described as the "vexing question of so-called 'plea
bargaining'lt remain - I am tempted to say "inevitably remain."
My understanding is that prior to the incorporation of the
charges

in a formal indictment or indictments, it would be

incorrect for the prosecution and defense to consult on a
plea.

After the indictment, however, there may be consulta

tion in which the defense offers to plead to one or more of
the charges.

To be sure, the prosecutor in accepting a plea

will have to be ready to justify in open court his failure
to go forward with evidence as to those charges to which the
accused pleads "not guilty."

I understand there may be some

difference of view as to the extent to which a judge may
reject, or should attempt to reject, the prosecutor's acceptance
of the plea.
Further, in the 1970 case of Regina v. Turner, the Court
of Appeal, through Lord Parker, recognized the propriety of a
discussion between the judge and both counsel for the defense and

.

for the prosecution because, as a given example, "counsel on
both sides may wish to discuss with the judge whether it would
be proper in a particular case, for 'the prosecution to accept
a plea to a lesser offence."

There remains, of course, the

question of what constitutes undue
causing him to plead guilty.

pres~ure

upon an accused

The Turner case itself involved

a situation where the Court of Appeal

found the communications

to the accused, which he believed came from the judge,
deprived ·the accused of free choice.
According to the Court in the Turner case, the judge
was never to indicate, even though it is common knowledge that
a plea of guilty operates as a mitigating factor in sentencing,
that, following conviction on a plea of not guilty, he would
impose a severer sentence.

"This could be taken to be undue

pressure on the accused."

Nor was the judge to indicate what

he would do on a guilty plea.

The judge was never to indicate

the sentence he was minded to impose except to say

if that

be the case -- "whatever happens, whether the accused pleads
guilty or not guilty, the sentence will or will not take a
particular form, e.g., a probation order, or a fine, or a
custodial sentence."

Whatever the discussion, however, counsel

for the defense was to inform the accused of what had taken
place.

In February of this year, in Regina v. Cain, the

Court of Appeal, in what seems to be a deviation from the
Turner case, said it was proper for the judge to indicate
to defending counsel what sentence the judge would be minded
to impose on a conviction following a not guilty plea.
to safeguard the accused against

a~y

But,

pressure as to how he

should plead, it was preferable that no disclosure of facts
relevant to sentence should be made to 'the accused.

This

would seem to place a considerable burden upon counsel.
understand that some resolution between the two cases has
recently been achieved through a practice direction .

I

Following the Turner opinion, R. M. Jackson warned,
"There is a lurking danger, particularly when courts are over
whelmed with work, that too much pressure may be put on a
defendant to plead guilty."

He went on to say that this

danger is minimized in the English system because the prose
cution cannot make any recommendation as to the sentence
imposed.

Prosecuting counsel would not be asked publicly or

privately by a judge as to his views on the appropriate
A "bargained" sentence, in this particular sense,

sentence.

is thus not possible •
......

Beyond, cut including,negotiated sentences, there
have been complaints in both the united States and Great
Britain about disparity in sentencing.

But, as Peter Low

has written, Iidisparate sentences in the United states are
more often measured in years rather than the months that may
more accurately describe the disparity problem in England."
Until recently in Great Britain there was a rather
stable relationship between the sentence imposed by the court
and the time served by an offender.

One-third of a sentence

could be taken off for good behavior, but there was no authority
for parole.

Then in 1967 the Criminal Justice Act provided a

mechanism for discretionary release of any prisoner who

h~

served at least one-third of his sentence or 12 months, which
ever is longer.
system in

~ngland

Perhaps part of the appeal of the parole
derives from the steady increase in the length

of sentences imposed.

In 1913 only two percent of all male

offenders received sentences of a year or longer.

By 1951

this figure had increased to 15.6 percent and by 1969 to
27.2 percent.

Another factor may have been overcrowding in

prison facilities.

Figures for 1970 -- when the prison

population peaked at about 40,000 -- showed that at times as
many as 14,000 inmates lived in circumstances prison officials
deem to be overcrowded.

The United States has long had a system of parole.
has been attacked on all sides recently.

It

Prison reformers con

demn it, because of the uncertainty it adds to the lives of
inmates.

The uncertainty has also been condemned as operating

to the detriment of the deterrent force of the criminal law.
It gives a fictional cast to the sentences imposed by courts.
For example, Federal Bureau of Prisons figures for fiscal years
1962 through 1972 indicate that during that period the average
length of sentence imposed upon offenders imprisoned for the
first time rose from about 29 to about 37 months, while the
proportion of the sentence actually served fell from 63 per
cent to 51 percent.
All these aspects of sentencing -- disparities, the
apparent unwillingness to send serious offenders to jail, and
the uncertainties of the parole system -- have led us to a
reconsideration of the entire area.

President Ford has pro

posed legislation to the Congress to reduce judicial discretion
in sentencing by establishing mandatory minimum sentences for
persons convicted of especially serious crimes when specific
mitigating circumstances are not present.

The President has also

instructed the Department of Justice to review the Federal sentencing
structure.

We have been giving consideration to the creation of

a sentencing commission to draft guidelines $etting forth narrow
ranges of sentencing options for various crimes and various

sorts of offenders.

Legislation has been proposed that

would authorize Federal courts of appeals to increase or de
crease the sentence imposed by the trial court.

A recommenda

tion is under study that would abolish parole and create a
system in which an offender would serve the entire sentence
imposed by the court except for a predetermined period taken
off for good behavior.

This recommendation would have to be

coupled with a reduction in the level of sentences now meted
out, so that the actual length of time served by offenders
would not increase dramatically.
The problem of crime can feed on itself.

A high

:

,

incidence of crime can erode popular confidence in the law' s
ability to protect the person and property of individuals.

;i

A

':

legal system that fails to generate the confidence of the people
loses one of its most important strengths.

If the criminal law

I

is to be effective, individuals must conform their behavior
to it voluntarily.

I

:

This voluntary adherence -- which can

;:

I

and must be supplemented by the deterrence of the criminal
law's sanctions but can never be replaced by it -- depends in

large measure upon the faith people have in the efficacy

an~

fair-

ness of the legal process. For this reason it is extremely J.II1portant

\
'
:

,

that attention be paid to those areas of the system
for one reason or another and

which,

perhaps sometimes incorrectly,

are thought to invite or enforce unfairness.

The institution

of the grand jury has lately come under this kind of an
attack. The attack has centered largely on the absence of
counsel 'for the witness in the grand jury proceedings,

on

the grand jury's secrecy, and on the grant of immunity to
compel testimony.

The fact that England has abolished the

grand jury invites us to consider a different way of doing
things.
In the modern setting in Britain, the protective function'
of the grand jury in determining whether to bring an indictment
had become "superfluous,

for it merely duplicated the formal

inquiry that was being conducted by the justices" in
hearings on committal to trial.

The investigative work

of the grand jury in England had been taken over by police.
'In general, the investigative function of the American grand
jury in compelling the secret production of documentary evidence
and the testimony of witnesses under oath does not exist in
England.

The power to compel testimony is available only in

connection with proceedings undertaken in open court.
There is no secrecy, though the news media are restricted
in how much they can publish' about the .preliminary i n q u i r y :
stage.

And, in the

Engli~h

examine at this stage.

system, the defense can cross

Thus, the advantage most

commonly asserted for the preservation of the grand jury in the
United States -- namely, its usefulness in compelling secret
testimony from witnesses who are either uncooperative or Who
fear reprisal -- is not available in the English system.

Even

the use -- commonly linked in this country with the grand jury
of grants of immunity to induce testimony is exceedingly rare in
England.

A grant of immunity by the device of a pardon under the

great seal or by agreement by the prosecution can only be made
. upon the approval of the Home Secretary, and the practice has been
widely criticized.

It must be noted that a witness at trial in

England has no privilege against self-incrimination with respect
to the matters at issue in the trial.

Only the defendant has

a privilege -- the privilege not to take the stand at all.

Thus,

the device of granting immunity by pardon is not legally required
to overcome the exertion of the privilege against self-incrimination.
It is useful only as a device,.for obtaining more complete and truth
ful testimony from a witness who feels in jeopardy.

Even though

no legal rule requires it, the general practice is that if a party
to a crime is to be called to testify against his accomplices, he
will be proceeded against first and only called to testify after
he has been convicted.
American commentators who favor the American grand jury's
broad powers of compulsion and secrecy generally criticize the
English system as making it difficult to prosecute in cases of
sophisticated criminal conspiracies.

Be that'as it may, the

English experience ought to be closely examined as we consider

grand jury reforms.

We should keep in mind, however, that to

emulate the British experience would require for us quite a
number of important changes.
Some recent proposals in this country for reform of the
criminal justice system to avoid abuses recently discovered are
distinctly American.

In general, they would interpose a court

between law enforcement officials and the techniques thought to
have a potential for abuse.

Thus, there are proposals for judi

cial warrants before investigations may begin, before informants
may be used, and proposals to afford subjects of investigation
the chance to go before the court to prevent investigators from
obtaining bank and credit information and records of long distance
telephone calls.

It is perhaps paradoxical that such proposals

come at a time when there is concern for the more effective investi
gation of organized and white collar crime.
In these proposals there has been little of what has been
called nthe Englishman's tolerance of, and indeed affection for,
the unwritten rule; his natural instinct . . . to act according
to what he believes to be the general understanding among his
fellows as to how he should behave rather than to look for a rule
permitting or prohibiting what he proposes to do and study its
terms.n
In fact, for a long period there has been a concern in our
country about the way law enforcement officials carry out their
inves tigations' .

For decades our Supreme Court has declared wi th

some constancy that state and federal police and prosecutors alike
are constitutionally bound to follow rules in investigating, inter
rogating, identifying, and prosecuting defendants.

The penalty

for overstepping the bounds has been to exclude evidence obtained
in violation of the rules.

For many years, this exclusionary

prophylaxis, entirely enforced by ,the

judiciar~

has been accepted

in the United States as the only feasible deterrent to police
misconduct.

This is of course a principal reason for the Miranda

rule.
By contrast, in England the emphasis has been on the exer
cise of self-restraint and

essent~ally

self-monitoring by the

police and the authorities.
The British do not require a judicial warrant for elec
tronic surveillance.

A 1957 Committee of Privy Councillors con

sidered the question of such surveillance, as well as mail open
ings, and concluded that the Home Secretary had the power without
a court order to authorize wiretapping as well as the interception
of mail.

This power, the councillors found, was used sparingly

and subject to strict rules formulated by the authorities.

Under

standards established by the Home Secretary, electronic surveil
lance may be used in espionage and security cases, as well as
.

'

cases involving serious crime, especially organized, professional
criminal activity.

Lord Devlin in an essay published in 1960

stated that "No evidence of any intercepted telephone conversation

has yet been tendered in a court of law."

It may be that

this is still so if the interception is made by governmental
action.

In a case in 1968, however, which came to the criminal

division of the Court of Appeal,

the Court approved the ruling

of the trial judge, admitting into evidence in a criminal
case material obtained through telephone taps placed by
private individuals.

The Lord Chief Justice pOinted out

that the tap had not been placed by pplice, security forces,
and the like, but hardly in such a way as to establish a rule.
It is perhaps significant that .the taps were originally made
in connection with a divorce proceeding where, as the Lord

Chief Justice said, "Evidence is admitted daily which results
from what many people would say is really outrageous conduct."
But it seems clear, in any event, that there would be no doc
trine as to the fruits of the poisoned tree to prevent the
knowledge gained from the fruits of electronic' surveillance
from being pursued, and the further results used.
There is a certain relaxation in the approach that
finds it possible and preferable to rely on responsible
practice, and that contrasts to our greater preference appar
ently for sanctions and rules.

In England, rules promulgated by the judges of Queen's Bench,
govern the conduct of police interrogations.· The rules provide
that a caution must always proceed an interrogation of the per
son in police custody.

But unlike the practice in the United

States, statements made by accused persons, who should have been
but were not given the warning, may be used in evidence if the
judge finds that they were made voluntarily.

Similarly, there

is no general ,rule in England automatically excluding evidence
illegally obtained by police.

As Lord Goddard wrote in Kuruma

v. The Queen (1955) A.C.197, where

il1~ga1

ammunition was dis

covered on appellant's person in a roadblock search, claimed
to have been undertaken without proper authority, "When it is a
question of the admission of evidence, strictly it is not whether
the method by which it is obtained is tortious or excusable,
but whether what has been obtained is relevant to the issues being
tried."

English judges, however, do have the broad discretion

to exclude any evidence which they feel would be unfair to the
defendant.
The contrast between the two systems is perhaps all the
greater as it touches upon the trial stage and the use of evidence
when it is realized that most often the function of prosecution
in England is undertaken by the police themse1ves--not, as most
commonly is the case in the United States, by prosecutors inde
pendent of the police hierarchy.

Some police authorities have

staffs of solicitors to handle'work, but there is little of the

independent role the United States Attorney plays in making
prosecutive decisions.

Indeed in England and Wales there has

been some criticism of the practice of police control of
prosecutions.

In recommending that England adopt the Scottish

system of prosecutors independent of police, the Criminal
Justice Committee of the Council of Justice 'wrote, "It is
difficult for investigators to achieve the necessary detachment"
in making

prosecutive decisions "and unfair to expect them to

do so."
But the extraordinary record of convictions, reprimands
and resignations produced by their active internal inspection
and enforcement of proper conduct by the police give Americans
a glimpse of an alternative mechanism to assure lawful law
enforcement.

The police themselves have established in England

elaborate mechanisms of internal inspection, and the number of
police officers who stand trial for misconduct in England is
extraordinarily high.

For example, in 1974, 51 London police

officers were convicted of criminal offenses and another 116 were
disciplined for misconduct.

In addition 90 officers resigned

,

before completion of disciplinary proceedings.
The similarities and differences between the English and
the United States systems for handling plea bargaining, or pleas
to lesser offenses; for the control of investigations or the
use of grand juries or substitutes for that institution; for
the attempt to regulate the police through exclusionary rules or

through the understanding and self enforcement of essential
rules of decency... -these mark the road of our common problems.
We do share a common tradition of a regard for fairness
and the rule of law, and our criminal justice 'systems now con...
tinue to face unusual strains because of the rise in crime.
Undoubtedly in many ways in response to these pressures we are
moving in the same direction.

Because we have felt that a re

thinking of standards for conduct at the inves·tigative stage
was imperative, at the Department of Justice we have instituted
guidelines of this sort covering a wide range of activities for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Guidelines covering the FBI's

domestic security, foreign counter-intelligence and foreign
intelligence work are now in place.

Because we have felt that

the public requires reassurance, and should have that reassurance.
we have favored legislation providing for a modified judicial
.

warrant procedure for

-.~---.-~.-

----~-
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foreign intelligence wiretaps

and microphone surveillance.

I believe it is clear that our federal

courts are concerned about the scope of the exclusionary rules
and their effect both upon trials and police behavior.

Overall

we are moving, I believe, to a more rational and effective system
of sentencing.

In all of these

ende~vors

we will continue to be

indebted to the English experience--both on-going and in our
common tradition.

